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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IMPLIED
WARRANTIES*
WALLACE SEDGWICK, ScoTT CONLEY
AND ROGER SLEIGHT**
I. INTRODUCTION
Within roughly the past fifty years, products liability has grown
from the occasional negligence case to a fulltime practice for thousands
of lawyers, and the end of this geometric growth is not in sight.
Warranties, and particularly implied warranties, have been playing
an increasingly important role in the products liability case. With privity
breaking down and becoming less of a bar, recovery on a warranty basis
has become available to more and more persons.
The rapid growth of the products liability field has been, to some
extent, the result of a change in social philosophy and technical in-
dustrial advances. Also an accelerating factor has been the activities
of the plaintiffs bar, liberal courts, and legal theorists. The rate of the
continued growth may somewhat depend on the efforts and activities
of defense attorneys.
This monograph is intended only to present a brief summary of
the law of implied warranties and is not intended to be exhaustive or
definitive. Neither does it discuss other areas of liability, with the ex-
ception of a brief mention of strict liability in tort. There is no dis-
cussion of negligence. There is no discussion of absolute liability, de-
fining that as the area in which ultrahazardous products are involved
and in which even assumption of risk is not a defense. There is no dis-
cussion of express warranties, defining that as the area in which explicit
statements or representations are made, either orally or in writing, with
respect to the goods in question.
Implied warranties may arise in a number of different types of situ-
ations. They are most important, however, in the area of sales. Every
sale, in the absence of a disclaimer, carries with it certain implied war-
ranties with respect to the item sold. This is not to say that there is an
absolute guarantee as to the quality of the item. But there is a guarantee
that the item meets certain standards.
* Published as a monograph by the Defense Research Institute, Inc., and re-
printed with their permission.
** Attorneys at Law, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia. Mr. Sedgwick is president-elect of the International Association of
Insurance Counsel.
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Whenever a warranty is at issue, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to show that a warranty existed, that the warranty was breached, and
that the breach caused the injury or damage complained of. It is often
said that if these three things are shown, the defendant will be strictly
liable. Be that as it may, it is true that warranty liability is liability
that does not require a showing of fault. Whether this means that the
defendant is strictly liable is left as a question of semantics. It is safe
to say that warranty liability is not absolute, for even though warranty,
breach, and cause are shown, the defendant is often held not liable.
The material discussed in the section on defenses is intended to
cover those factors which negate liability where liability would other-
wise exist. It roughly corresponds to those matters on which the de-
fendant has the burden of proof. But whether a given fact goes to
negating liability or merely to showing that the plaintiff has not estab-
lished his case is not always that clear. Thus it should be remembered
that some of the matters discussed as defenses may also go to the issue
of whether the plaintiff has established his case. In fact, the easiest and
best defense is in preventing that very thing.
II. HISTORY
The earliest cases of warranty were in the nature of a tort action
for deceit." Breach of warranty differed from fraud only in that it did
not require scienter or an awareness by the seller of the falsity of his
representations. To establish a warranty it was necessary that the seller
use the word "warrant" or at least words importing that they were
purposely made for the buyer to rely upon.2 "The most emphatic af-
firmation or representation of fact was not construed as a warranty,
although the parties might have intended it to operate as such. Much
less was there any recognition of such a thing as the implied warranty." 3
The law of assumpsit began to develop in the fifteenth century and
seems to have been at least partially based on the earlier warranty
actions. It was originally conceived as a tort action, but soon became
classified with covenant rather than trespass on the case. 4 Following
the same pattern, express warranties eventually were recognized as a
term of the sales contract and were also treated as a matter of covenant
until finally, in 1778, Stuart v. Wilkins5 granted relief for breach of
warranty in assumpsit. There were certain pleading advantages to as-
sumpsit, and case fell into comparative disuse as a remedy. Thus, war-
1 For references to medieval statutes governing implied warranties from the
seventh century and early case law concerning express warranties from the
late thirteenth century, see Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent De-fects: An Historical Comparative Law Study, 1961 INs. L. J. 547, 548-50.
2 Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1603).
3 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 379-80 (1906).
4 1 WILLISTON, SALES 501-02 (rev. ed. 1948).
5 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
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ranty went from an action in tort to an action primarily in contract,
although destined to retain many of its tort characteristics.
Early sales law, in the absence of an express warranty, was gov-
erned by the old maxim of caveat emptor.6 Broader rules appeared in
the early nineteenth century as greater protection for the buyer was
desired. Along with an implied warranty of title, two distinct implied
warranties of quality developed in those cases in which the buyer relied
on the skill and judgment of the seller-an implied warranty of mer-
chantability and an implied warranty of fitness.
The leading case is Gardiner v. Gray.7 It was the case of the sale
of "waste silk" by sample, and neither the buyer nor the seller had an
opportunity to inspect the goods before delivery. The goods delivered
did not meet the purposes of waste silk, and Lord Ellenborough set
out the fundamental principle of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability in terms of saleability:
I am of the opinion, however, that under such circumstances,
the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering
the description in the contract. Without any particular warranty,
this is an implied term in every such contract. Where there is no
opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat
emptor does not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist that
it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, but the intention
of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in
the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract
between them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods
to lay them on a dunghill.
As the warranty of merchantable quality developed, it came to mean
that goods must be of a quality to pass under the same kind or descrip-
tion specified in the agreement and must be reasonably fit for the ordi-
nary uses to which such goods are put."
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose logically followed,
with the first cases generally in the field of shipping. In Gray v. Cox,9
Abbott C. J. said: "If a person sold a commodity for a particular pur-
pose, he must be understood to warrant it reasonably fit and proper
for such purpose."
The early implied warranty decisions were couched in terms of
giving effect to the unexpressed intentions of the parties and were
treated primarily as contract matters. But the idea grew that warranties
6 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 584.
74 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815). An earlier case concerning merch-
antable quality is Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194(Ex. 1810). Sale by sample later became a separate implied warranty con-
tained in UNIFORM SALFS AcT §16 and an express warranty under UrFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313 (1) (c).
s Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rxv.
117, 121 (1943). The matter of implied warranties was summed up in Jones
v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868).
9 107 Eng. Rep. 999 (K.B. 1825).
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were implied by law, independent of any intention of the parties. To
speak of a warranty as a term of the contract was "to speak the language
of pure fiction." 10 I
Today an implied warranty may be treated as a matter of tort
(innocent misrepresentation of fact), contract (implied-in-fact term
of the agreement), or public policy (implied-in-law). It seldom makes
any difference which theory is followed, but occasionally it is important,
and courts are prone to adopt that which best suits their needs. Where
privity is a problem, the tort theory can be followed. If reliance is ab-
sent, the contract theory is available. And if there are problems with
disclaimers or evidence rules, warranty will be imposed by law.'
Whether a tort or contract theory is followed may also cause a dif-
ferent rule to govern such matters as the survival of actions, statute of
limitations, the measure of damages, or recovery for wrongful death.
12
With the intention of codifying the then existing common law of
sales, England adopted the Sale of Goods Act in 1893.3 The Uniform
Sales Act (also referred to herein as the Sales Act or the USA), based
on the Sale of Goods Act, was recommended for adoption by the Com-
missioners on Uniform Statd Laws in 1906. Section 15 of the Uniform
Sales Act, governing implied warranties, was taken almost verbatim
from section 14 of the English statute. The Sales Act was eventually
adopted by thirty-four states, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Co-
lumbia. The last states to put the Sales Act into effect were Arkansas
and Colorado which did so in 1942.'1
Eventually a more comprehensive and modern code, which would
govern all facets of commercial transactions, was thought desirable.
Work on such a project began in 1942, and the Uniform Commercial
Code (also referred to herein as the Code or the UCC) was first pro-
mulgated in 1952. A complete revised text and comments edition was
published in 1958. To date, twenty-nine states and the District of Colum-
bia have adopted the UCC, including seven states which had not adopted
the USA. 5 It is likely that many more states will follow suit. In those
10 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. Rav. 415, 420
(1911).
IL Prosser, supra note 8, at 122-25.
22 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L. J. 1099, 1126-27 (1960).
'1 Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71.
14 Left as common law states were Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, with Louisiana as a civil law state.
15 In the following states the UCC has been enacted but will not become effective
until the date indicated: California (January 1, 1965) ; Maine (December 31,
1964); Missouri (July 1, 1965); Montana (January 1, 1965); Nebraska
(September 1, 1965); New York (September 27, 1964) ; Virginia (January
1, 1966) ; Wisconsin (July 1, 1965).
Sales Act states which have not adopted the UCC are Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Utah, Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington.
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states which have not yet adopted the Code, the provisions of the Code
will be persuasive authority, just as the Sales Act has been persuasive
in many common law states.
III. WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
Under the Sales Act, the requirement that goods be of merchantable
quality applies only when (1) the goods are purchased by description,
(2) from a dealer in goods of that description: "Where the goods are
bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that descrip-
tion (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.""',
The description may be general or specific, even to the point of identify-
ing the goods by their brand or trade name.
One of the most quoted definitions of a sale by description is con-
tained in Kohn v. Ball :17 "The term sale by description strictly means
an executory sale where the article is not present, but the term has been
broadened to include all sales, whether or not the goods are present,
where there is no adequate opportunity for inspection."
Not all jurisdictions follow this definition, and a small number have
refused to find a warranty where specific goods are purchased, con-
fining the warranty to cases in which the description is essential to
identification of the goods sold. Thus there is some authority that it is
not a sale by description when the purchaser selects the articles de-
sired, as in a supermarket." Prosser-9 and the modern view argue that
the description may be an essential part of the contract, even when
specific goods are involved, and that holdings that the warranty of
merchantability does not arise in the sale of specific goods are probably
the result of an additional factor such as an implied disclaimer, the ob-
viousness of the defect, or a desire to limit liability.20
The definition is also a little narrow in that inspection is generally
not considered in deciding whether a sale is by description, but rather
whether a warranty which might otherwise exist is negated by actual
inspection or an opportunity to inspect. Most jurisdictions do not permit
a mere opportunity to inspect to negate a warranty. Further, actual in-
spection will ordinarily not eliminate a warranty as to undiscovered or
latent defects.
Only persons who generally or ordinarily handle goods of the kind
in question impliedly warrant merchantability. At common law, this
Common law states which have not adopted the UCC are Florida, Kansas,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. Louisiana remains
a civil law state.
26 UNIFORM SALES Acr §15 (2).
"736 Tenn. App. 281, 286, 254 S.W. 2d 755, 758 (1952).
Is Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F. 2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955). Contra, Sams v.
Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 le. 10, 170 A. 2d 160 (1961).
19 Prosser, supra note 8, at 143.
20 Id. at 145.
1964]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
dealer was not liable if he was not also the manufacturer, primarily
because there was no element of reliance. The USA made the dealer
a warrantor, even if not the manufacturer, and this was followed by
several common law states. However, Georgia, West Virginia, and
Mississippi apparently still hold that a dealer who is not also the manu-
facturer does not warrant that his goods are merchantable.
2
1
Where second-hand goods are sold, there may be an implied war-
ranty that they are merchantable-at least as second-hand goods. In
most cases denying existence of the warranty, the seller was not a
dealer.2 2 However, Texas has failed to find the warranty even where
the seller was a dealer.
23
Definitions of merchantability are legion, but it is possible to draw
some general conclusions as to the minimum obligations of the seller.
24
1. The goods must conform to their name, kind, and description.
For example, if A agrees to sell red apples to B, he must deliver red
apples. Green or yellow apples will not do. Neither will red plums or
peaches. The description might be more specific such as "#2 Common
& Btr. rough green Alder with Maple developing. ' 25 That is what must
be delivered. The description is taken to call for goods usually sold by
that name as understood by the trade.26 Whether the goods conform
to the description is a question for the jury. It is at least arguable that
evidence of the price paid is admissible to show what the agreement
contemplated as merchantable goods.
2. The goods must be marketable under the contract designation.
If a buyer purchases for his own use, he must receive what dealers
customarily sell as the same product.2 7 If the buyer purchases to resell
the goods must be generally marketable, with their true character known,
under the same name or description.
Saleability means that the merchandise has been properly packed,
-2 8
that it complies with applicable statutes, 29 and even that the buyer
will not be liable for a license tax not necessary for the goods as they
were described.30 The warranty generally arises when title passes and
the goods need only be saleable at that time in the same market.
3
'
21 See Bel v. Adler, 63 Ga. App. 473, 11 S.E. 2d 495 (1940) ; Pennington v. Cran-
berry Fuel Co., 117 W.Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936) ; Kroger Grocery Co. v.
Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933).
22 Prosser, supra note 8, at 146.
23 Norvell-Wilder Supply Co. v. Richardson, 300 S.W. 2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957).
24 Based on Prosser, supra note 8.
25Lindsey v. Stalder, 120 Colo. 58, 208 P. 2d 83 (1949).
26 Frith v. Mitchell, 176 Eng. Rep. 647 (Q.B. 1865).
27Frantz Equip. Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A. 2d 702 (1952).
28 Ritter v. Erlich, 152 F. 2d 181 (2d Cir. 1945) (dictum).
29Manning Mfg. Co. v. Hartol Prod. Corp., 99 F. 2d 813 (2d Cir. 1938).
30 Haynor Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 147 N.C. 267, 61 S.E. 54 (1908).
31 Sumner Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co., [1922] 1 K.B. 55.
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3. The goods must be fit for the general purposes for which they
are sold.
A coffeepot which will not make coffee,3 2 or flour that will not make
bread,3 3 is not merchantable because it is not fit for its ordinary or pre-
dominant use.
The warranty of merchantability was rewritten by the Uniform
Commercial Code:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement,
of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made
on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.A
The major change under the Code is the abolition of the require-
ment that the sale be by description. Under UCC section 2-313 (b), a
purchase by description creates an express warranty.
The minimum standards of merchantability which developed under
the Sales Act are set out in UCC section 2-314 (2). It should be noted
that failure of the goods to conform to promises of fact made on the
label will normally also create an express warranty in the same manner
as express warranties are created by advertisements or directions sheets.
Comment 2 to section 314 states that the "meaning of the terms of the
agreement as recognized in the trade" will determine Nihen the warranty
is imposed.
IV. WARRANTY OF FITNESS
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose has two basic ele-
ments: The buyer must (1) make his particular purpose known to the
seller, and (2) rely on the skill and judgment of the seller.
32 McCabe v. L. K. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E. 2d 254 (1953).
33 Kaull v. Blacker, 107 Kan. 578, 193 Pac. 182 (1920).34 UNIFOR11 COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314.
1964]
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Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment (whether he be the grower or the manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably fit for such purpose.
35
Originally the particular purpose was a special as distinct from a
general purpose, but as greater consumer protection was desired the
particular purpose came to be that purpose for which a given buyer
intended to use the goods. Thus the particular purpose may be no more
than the ordinary purpose for which the goods are manufactured.
The seller may be informed either impliedly or expressly of the
buyer's purpose. When this purpose is no more than an ordinary pur-
pose, the courts have had little trouble in finding that the seller was
at least impliedly aware of that purpose. 36
If someone purchases an ordinary bicycle, he may tell the seller that
he is going to use it for riding in the park. This is his particular purpose
in buying the bicycle. Even if the buyer says nothing to the seller, the
latter is held to impliedly know of the buyer's particular purpose, for
it is the same as the ordinary purpose for which bicycles are made,
assuming there is nothing unusual about the park. But if the buyer
intends to use the bicycle for racing, he must bring that fact home to
the seller in order to hold him to a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.
The goods furnished need not be perfect or even the best of their
kind, but only reasonably fit for the purpose of the buyer.37
The buyer must also rely on the skill and judgment of the seller. It
is probable that this reliance must be justifiable, although this is not a
specific requirement of the Sales Act,38 and liability has been denied
where the court thought that reliance was not justified. 31
Where the buyer designates specific goods or specifically describes
the goods to be purchased, it is less likely that he has relied on the
seller's judgment.40 Thus, goods purchased by their brand or trade
name are expressly not covered by the warranty of fitness under the
Sales Act,41 although courts have side-stepped this provision where it
-5 UNIFORM SALES ACr §15(1).
36 See Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 491, 158 A. 2d 110, 117
(1960).
3 Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc. 147 Conn. 460, 466, 162 A. 2d 513,
516 (1960).
38 See In re Belle-Moc, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 429, 435 (S.D. Me. 1960) ; 1 WILUSTON,
SALES 607 (rev. ed. 1948).
3 See Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P. 2d 682 (1952).
40 See Turkish State Rys. Administration v. Vulcan Iron Works, 153 F. Supp.
616, 620-22 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Louis
De Jonge & Co., 179 Pa. Super. 155, 161, 115 A. 2d 837, 839 (1955).
41 UNIFORM SALES Acr §15(4).
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appeared that a buyer purchased a particular item at the suggestion
of the seller.
42
Merely selecting an item from the stock of the seller has precluded
a finding of reliance on occasion,4 but the majority holds that it is
enough that the purchaser relies on the skill and judgment of the re-
tailer in his selection of the products which he offers for sale.4 4
The occupation of the seller is relevant to the question of reliance,
and it should be noted that this warranty is not limited to those who deal
in goods of the kind in question, as is the warranty of merchantability.
In fact, it may still be arguable that the purchaser cannot rely on the
retailer, at least where the goods are in a sealed container. 45
The Uniform Commercial Code has made several minor changes
in the fitness warranty:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modi-
fied under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.4 6
The most important change is probably the elimination of the trade
name exception. The fact that goods are purchased under their brand
or trade name is to be just one of the considerations in determining
whether there was reliance.47
Under the Code, the seller need not have actual knowledge of either
the particular purpose or the reliance of the buyer; it is enough that the
seller has reason to know.4 s Information as to the purpose of the buyer
may come from any source, while the Sales Act required that the
purpose be made known by the buyer.
The Code has also eliminated the Sales Act requirement that the
42 Halterman v. Louisville Bridge & Iron Co., 254 S.W. 2d 493 (Ky. Ct. App.
1953). The mere fact that an article has a trade name wil not preclude the
warranty. Torrance v. Durisol, Inc., 20 Conn. Supp. 62, 112 A. 2d 589 (Super.
Ct. 1956).
43 Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F. 2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Williams v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P. 2d 662 (1955).
44Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P. 2d 848 (1952).
45 See Bradford v. Moore Bros. Feed & Grocery, 268 Ala. 217, 105 So. 2d 825
(1958) ; Bel v. Adler, 63 Ga. App. 473, 11 S.E. 2d 495 (1940). The fact that
the goods come in a sealed container is probably not the sole reason for deny-
ing liability, however. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability-Smith v.
Hensley, 48 VA. L. REv. 152, 160 n. 55 (1962).
46UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-315. Rhode Island has added the following
sentence to this section: "As to foodstuffs or drinks sold for human con-
sumption in sealed containers, there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, and such warranty shall extend from
the seller and the manufacturer or packer of such goods to the person or
persons described in section 6A-2-318 of this chapter." R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§6A-2-315 (Supp. 1961).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-315, comment 5.
48 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-315, comment 1.
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goods be "reasonably" fit, but it is unlikely that the deletion of this word
will have much practical effect.49
V. LIMITATIONS ON FINDING OF WARRANTY
On several occasions courts have refused to find an implied war-
ranty where there has technically not been a sale, although it is not
certain why they felt compelled to so hold. The Sales Act does not
provide for the implication of warranties in nonsales cases,50 and some
courts have apparently been reluctant to analogize. Conscious of this, the
draftsmen of the Code have pointed out that the warranty sections
were not intended to restrict the recognition of warranties in non-sale
areas. 5' Those jurisdictions which require a sale before implying war-
ranties are generally those which consider warranty in the nature of
contract rather than tort.
A. Service
Perhaps the leading case in which the court did not find a sale is
Pernmutter v. Beth David Hosp.52 The plaintiff was a patient in defend-
ant hospital and became seriously ill due to a transfusion of contami-
nated blood, which she alleged was "sold" to her by the defendant for
sixty dollars. The court held that plaintiff's contract with defendant
was primarily one for the rendition of services and, as such, was not
governed by the provisions of the Sales Act. California codified this
result, but only with respect to blood products, 53 and the California
Supreme Court has held the administration of polio vaccine to be a
sale rather than a service.5 4 That case might have had a different re-
sult had the defendants been the physicians, as in Perlmutter, rather
than the manufacturer. 55
Construction contracts, in which the furnishing of materials is in-
cidental to the labor, have been held not to be sales contracts, and no
implied warranty has been found.56
Some jurisdictions have classified the supplying of food by a restau-
rateur as a service,57 but the modern and majority view is that the
furnishing of food is a sale and raises an implied warranty that the
49A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Corn-
nercial Code, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1087,1156 (1963).50 See UNIFORM SALES ACT §15.
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313, comment 2.
52308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E. 2d 792 (1954); accord, Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp.
Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P. 2d 662 (1956), 59 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1958) ; Dibblee
v. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P. 2d 1085 (1961).
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1623.
54 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal.. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).55 Liability was denied on the ground that the charitable immunity of a hospital
extended to an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption because
the action sounded in tort in Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W. 2d 80(Ky. Ct. App. 1954).56 Foley Corp. v. Dove., 101 A. 2d 841 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1954).
57 McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934).
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food is wholesome and fit for human consumption. 5 A few courts have
implied the warranty without finding a sale. 9 The Uniform Code
specifically includes the "serving for value of food or drink" in the
section on merchantability."
B. Bailnents
Many jurisdictions will imply a warranty in a variety of bailment
situations, although not where the bailment is gratuitous,61 or where
the plaintiff is not in privity,62 or where a specific piece of equipment
is hired.6 3 The bailor impliedly warrants that the article he supplies
is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is hired.6 4 However, the
plaintiff-bailee must generally show more than a simple breach of war-
ranty, and he is usually required to show that the bailor was negligent
in failing to discover the defect.65 A showing of negligence is more
likely to be required where there is a personal injury loss rather than
a property or commercial loss.66
There is still a great deal of room for arguing that a transaction
is of the nature of a service or bailment rather than a sale. The finding
of a service or bailment may preclude the finding of implied warranties
or at least subject the plaintiff to more stringent requirements as to
proof and privity.
C. Incomplete Sale
Liability has sometimes been denied where a sale has not been
consummated, as where the buyer has made a selection but has not
yet paid for it. These cases are primarily self-service supermarket cases,
and the leading case is Day v. Grand Union Co., 6 7 in which the plaintiff
picked up a bottle of beer from the counter and it exploded in her
hand. However, the Day case is of questionable authority, even in New
York.65
ft is arguable in the exploding bottle cases that there has been no
sale of the bottle by the immediate seller of the contents, particularly
where the bottle is returnable. The courts, however, have never sep-
arated the bottle from the sale of its contents and have refused to deny
liability on this ground, whether the bottle was technically sold or
58See DICKERSON, PRODucTs LIABIUTY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER (1951).59 Amdal v. F. W. Woodworth Co., 84 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314(1).
61 See Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941).
62 Cf. Nelson v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 11 N.J. 413, 94 A. 2d 655 (1953).
63 Pennsylvania R.R. v. J. Jacob Shannon & Co., 363 Pa. 438, 70 A. 2d 321 (1950).
64 Price Boiler & Welding Co. v. Gordon, 138 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
65 McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P. 2d 810 (1953). But see Covello
v. New York 17 Misc. 2d 637, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 396 (1959).
66 See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality it; Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM.
L. Rrv. 653, 658 (1957).67280 App. Div. 253, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 436, aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 821, 109
N.E. 2d 609 (1952) ; accord, Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A. 2d 24 (1949).68 See Sanchez-Lopez v. Fedco Food Corp.,. 211 N.Y.S. 2d 953 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
1961).
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not. 9 Oklahoma may still hold that there is no warranty with respect
to the bottle in either case. 0
D. Inspection
Under the common law, there was some authority for the proposi-
tion that no implied warranty existed if there was an actual inspection
or an opportunity to inspect, even if the defect was not discoverable.7
The Sales Act, however, precludes the finding of an implied warranty
only where the defect is known or obvious and not if it is latent: "If the
buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards
defects which such examination ought to have revealed.""2
It should be noted that this section only applies when there has been
an actual examination and imposes no duty to inspect.73 However, there
is authority under the Sales Act which excludes implied warranties
where inspection would have revealed a defect and the buyer failed to
do so." If the buyer makes an inadequate inspection and misses an
obvious defect, no warranty will arise.7 5
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that
when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him.7 1 (Emphasis added.)
Comment 8 to section 2-316 states that to bring the transaction
within the scope of "refused to examine," there must be a demand by
the seller that the buyer fully examine the goods, followed by a re-
fusal of the buyer to inspect. If the demand is accompanied by words
of merchantability or fitness, it may give rise to an express warranty
which will be considered to have been expressly incorporated into the
agreement. The buyer's skill and the normal method of examining
goods will determine what defects are excluded by an examination,
but obvious defects will be excluded in every case.
E. Disclaimer
A seller may limit his liability by means of an express disclaimer,
but such a disclaimer will be strictly construed against him.7 7 Some
courts require that the disclaimer be brought to the attention of the
r9 Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E. 2d 293 (1961). Com-
pare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313, comment 2.
70 See Soter v. Griesedieck W. Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P. 2d 575 (1948),
4 A.L.R. 2d 458 (1949).
71 See 1 WILLISTON, SALES §234 n. 12 (rev. ed. 1948).
72 UNIFORIA SALES AcT §15(3).
72 See Hughes v. Diehl, 178 F. 2d 329 (4th Cir. 1949).
74 McCormick v. Hoyt, 53 Wash. 2d 338, 333 P. 2d 639 (1959).
5 See Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W. 2d 265 (1959).
76 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316 (3) (b), comment.
,7 E.g., Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
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buyer,78 and no court will permit a disclaimer to justify the delivery of
goods which do not meet the description in the agreement.
An express warranty may be treated as a disclaimer, but only where
it conflicts with an implied warranty. USA section 15(6) provides
that "an express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty
or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith."' 9
Disclaimers were first denied effect as a matter of public policy in
cases in which food was involved.80 Recently, courts have refused to
enforce a disclaimer in situations in which the buyer was in an unequal
bargaining position.8 ' Where privity is not otherwise a problem, dis-
claimers may be binding on third parties.s 2 On the other hand, dis-
claimers made by the manufacturer are probably not effective when
the action is against an intermediate seller.8 3
Occasionally even an implied disclaimer may be found. The seller
may indicate that the goods are defective, or he may offer an oppor-
tunity to inspect, which is sufficient notice to the buyer that he must
rely on his own judgment. The past dealings of the parties,8 4 the
custom of the trade,8 5 and even the nature of the goods (waste products,
secondhand goods, a new invention) 6 may also raise an implied dis-
claimer.
The Uniform Commercial Code has explicit provisions relating
to disclaimers.8 7 To exclude the implied warranty of merchantability,
the language must mention merchantability and must be conspicuous
if in writing. To exclude the implied warranty of fitness, the exclusion
must be in conspicuous writing, but the language may be general. Im-
plied warranties may also be excluded by common expressions such as
"with all faults" or "as is," if that is the usage of the trade.
The Code permits the court to refuse to enforce all or part of a
contract if it finds that it is unconscionable as a matter of law.s8 Courts
may now discard the fictions previously used to reach the same result.
7S Sensabaugh v. 'Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, Inc., 223 Md. 593, 165 A. 2d 914
(1960).
79 There is a minority view that the existence of written express warranties ex-
cludes all implied warranties. See, e.g., Interstate Motor Freight Sys. v. Gaso-
line Equip. Co., 107 Ind. App. 494, 24 N.E. 2d 418 (1948).
s0Lnn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 110 (N.Y.C.
Munic. Ct. 1939).
8s State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W. 2d 449 (1961) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A. 2d 69 (1960), 75 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1961).82 See McVey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 288 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1961).
83 Sokolski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E. 2d 874 (1942).84 UNIFORM SALES Acr §71; Crofoot Lumber, Inc. v. Ford, 191 Cal. App. 2d
238, 12 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1961).
85 See Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co., 193 Cal. 62, 222 Pac. 817 (1924);
Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P. 2d 270 (1932).
86 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. RE,.
117, 165-66 (1943).8 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316.
88 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-302.
1964]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
VI. EXTENT OF LIABILITY
As warranty came to be considered more and more contractual in
nature, it was subjected to many of the rules governing contract actions.
The foremost of these was that a contractual relationship, or privity,
had to exist between the parties before a warranty action could be
sustained. However, until the development of modern marketing tech-
niques, privity did not present much of a problem, as there was seldom
a middleman involved and the manufacturer generally dealt directly
with the consumer.
The privity requirement is now the subject of much abuse by the
writers and the cases. With the possible exception of a few minor
areas, lack of privity is no longer of any consequence in a negligence
action, and those jurisdictions which consider warranty as essentially
in the nature of tort have less difficulty in dispensing with the privity
requirement. The same is true where implied warranties are considered
as matters of public policy.
The first exceptions to the privity requirement came in the early
twentieth century in the area of food and beverages.8 9 It was well
settled by then that the seller of food could be liable in warranty to an
injured consumer to whom he had made a direct sale.90 At least partially
in response to widespread clamoring for action on the problem of
defective and misbranded foods and drugs, the courts extended this
liability to third persons. Well over half of the states which have con-
sidered the issue have now abolished the privity requirement in food
cases. 91 Even New York, one of the staunchest defenders of privity,
recently extended the food retailer's warranty to all members of the
purchaser's household. 9 -
The privity requirement is gradually being abandoned in other
areas as well. The leading case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,93
in which plaintiff's wife was injured while driving a new car purchased
by plaintiff-husband. Both the dealer and the manufacturer were made
defendants. In permitting the wife to recover, the court said that the
implied warranty of merchantability extends not only to the purchaser
of a car, but to "members of his family and others occupying or using
it with his consent." 94
Henningsen, by finding that the warranty runs with the goods to
all who are likely to be hurt by use of an unfit commodity for an ordi-
89 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
90 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1104 (1960).
91 Id. at 1107-10.
92 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y. 2d 195, 173 N.E. 2d 773, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (1961).
9332 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960), 75 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1961).
94 Id. at 414, 161 A. 2d at 100.
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nary purpose, essentially abolished the privity requirement. It is possible
that even an innocent bystander might now be able to recover.95
Another non-food case which did not find it necessary to go quite
so far is Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.98 The court in that case, ap-
parently assuming that warranties extended to members of the family
-in every case, simply found that the plaintiff-employee was a member
of the industrial "family" of the employer.
The Uniform Commercial Code section 2-318 has codified a few
of the exceptions to the original privity rule:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
It should be noted that this section is limited to the family and guests
and covers only personal injuries.
The discussion up to this point has been primarily concerned with
recovery by someone other than the immediate buyer. But there is the
further question of whether recovery may be had against someone other
than the immediate seller or retailer. Here again privity has tradi-
tionally been a bar, and here again it is breaking down.
Henningsen is again the leading case, for not only was a non-pur-
chaser allowed to recover, but both the husband and wife were per-
mitted to recover against the manufacturer. In allowing recovery against
the manufacturer, the court held that an implied warranty that an
automobile is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it from
the manufacturer into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. The court
reasoned that society's interests can only be served by eliminating the
privity requirement and placing the burden of losses on those who are
able to either control the defect or distribute the losses when they do
occur.
One factor which may indicate that privity may still be of some
moment, even in New Jersey, is that the court placed a great deal of
emphasis on the advertising. Where there is little or no advertising,
lack of privity may still bar recovery, perhaps on the basis that the
plaintiff is unforeseeable. 9 7
Henningsen presages further elimination of the privity requirement
although it is still very important in most jurisdictions, particularly in
95 See Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A. 2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963).
06 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P. 2d 575 (1960). Contra, Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,
409 Pa. 610, 187 A. 2d 575 (1963).
97 See Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 NJ. Super. 397, 175 A. 2d 658 (Super.
Ct. 1961).
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non-food cases.98 Two states have already adopted statutes abolishing
privity to some degree.-
Lacking a statute, a number of devices have been employed by the
courts as a means of circumventing the privity requirement. 10 0 For
example, the retailer has been found to be merely the agent of the con-
sumer,10 1 the consumer has been held to be a third-party beneficiary
of the retailer's contract with the manufacturer, 10 2 or the retailer's war-
ranty from the manufacturer has been said to be assigned to the con-
sumer
0 3
Even if the wholesaler is not the actual manufacturer, he may be
held to the manufacturer's warranties, particularly if he represents
himself as the manufacturer. The argument for holding the wholesaler-
middleman is that he is likely to know much more about the product
and its manufacturer than the retailer. The arguments against circuity
of action and for finding a solvent defendant also apply. However, lack
of privity may still protect the middleman, and he may even be immune
where there is no privity requirement as to the manufacturer. 04 But he
should be wary of Kansas, for he will be liable there even in a non-food
case.'05
VII. DEFENSES
Warranty liability is strict but not necessarily absolute. Even though
a warranty and a breach thereof are established, some defenses remain
to the defendant.
A. Contributory Negligence
Logically, contributory negligence should not be a defense to a
warranty action, because negligence is no part of the plaintiff's case.
9s See Prosser, supra note 90, at 1107-08, for a breakdown of the food cases
by states. See also FRUMER & FRIEDMAN §16.04(2) (b).
99 A. CODE ANN. §96-307 (1958), which was repealed when Georgia adopted
the UCC. Privity in Georgia is now governed by GA. CODE ANN. §109A-2-318
(Supp. 1962), which is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318.
VA. CODE ANN. ch. 29, §8-654.3 (Supp. 1962), which states: "Lack of privity
between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought
against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach
of warranty, express or implied ... although the plaintiff did not purchase
the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manu-
facturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods .. "
California did not adopt UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318 because it was
thought that case law in that state had already extended greater coverage
than that envisioned by this section.
100 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-55 (1957),
discloses twenty-nine different theories by which privity has been avoided.
101 Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P. 2d 1015 (1955).
102 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (food).
103 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 11o. App. 275, 90 SAV.
2d445 (1936) (food).
104 Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W. 2d 153 (1952) (food)
(sealed package).
105 Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan .501, 370 P. 2d 116 (1962)
Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P. 2d 413 (1954). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), ToRTs §402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962), would make any seller
of food strictly liable in tort.
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Some courts so hold. 10 6 But as testimony to the tort nature of warranty,
many cases have denied liability in the language of contributory negli-
gence.' 0 7 In each case it would have been better to talk in terms of the
non-existence of a warranty, assumption of risk by the plaintiff (or
avoidable consequences), or an intervening cause.
Close inspection of warranty cases in which contributory negli-
gence superficially appears to function as an affirmative defense
usually reveals that the court is in fact refusing to find a breach
of warranty or is applying some form of the rule of avoidable
consequences. In other opinions the language is so enigmatic that
no definite explanation can be given. 10 8
In fact, there are no cases in which the court has found a breach
of warranty and then sustained a defense based on ordinary contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff. However, there is language in a few
cases which indicates that contributory negligence might be a defense.
In DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 09 the primary issue before the
court was the absence of privity between the plaintiff's deceased and
the defendant supplier. But the court stated that "in the absence of con-
tributory negligence such workman could recover on the basis of a
breach of warranty against the party who sold the wheel to his em-
ployer."1' 0 The language would indicate that contributory negligence
could bar recovery even if a breach of-warranty is found.
In Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter,"' the court, applying Louisi-
ana law, refused to find that contributory negligence existed as a matter
of law. But in indicating that the question was a proper one for the
jury, the court impliedly acknowledged the availability of contributory
negligence as a warranty defense. Although there is dictum in Parish v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.1" that "contributory negligence may
be asserted as a defense to the breach of warranty action," the authori-
ties cited for this proposition are generally weak, and only two are
warranty cases. One of the authorities cited, however, is Fredendall v.
A brahain & Straus"3 in which the plaintiff, contrary to the instructions,
used some cleaning fluid in a small unventilated room. The court said:
"We think the evidence conclusively shows that the plaintiff failed to use
reasonable care in the use of the fluid and that this default was an essen-
tial cause of her illness. We do not pass upon any other question.""
4
106 Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962)
(food); Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr.
814 (1963).
107 Jarnot v. Ford Mfotor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A. 2d 568 (1959).
108 Note, Contributory Negligence in Warraty Law, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 85, 94
(1962).
109 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N.E. 2d 289 (C.P. 1951).
10 Id. at 64, 102 N.E. 2d at 293.
111 212 F. 2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955).
112 13 Misc. 2d 33, 46, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7, 21 (N.Y.C. M1unic. Ct. 1958).
"1 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E. 2d 11 (1938).
114 Id. at 148, 18 N.E. 2d at 11.
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It is a moot point whether this language means that contributory
negligence is a defense or that there was no breach or no warranty.
As contrasted with these four cases, many cases have clearly denied
the defense of contributory negligence." 5 One court has accepted it
as a defense to a negligence action, but denied it as a defense to a
warranty action in the same case." 6
It should be again pointed out that the above discussion is primarily
concerned with contributory negligence as a defense when a breach
of warranty has been clearly established. The majority of the cases
which discuss contributory negligence either do not establish a breach
or are not concerned with ordinary negligence as a defense, and it
should be remembered that those courts are using the language of con-
tributory negligence when the facts indicate one of the defenses dis-
cussed below.
B. Assumption of Risk
This is the defense on which denial of liability is most often.predi-
cated, although it is commonly discussed in terms of contributory negli-
gence. It has been noted that every case in which contributory negli-
gence has been upheld as a defense has been one in which the plaintiff
discovered the defect but continued to make use of the product:
When the cases are examined, however, they fall into a very
consistent pattern, and it is only their language which is confus-
ing. Those which refuse to allow the defense have been cases
in which the plaintiff negligently failed to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
: * .Those which have permitted the defense all have been cases
in which the plaintiff has discovered th6 defect and the danger,
and has proceeded nevertheless to make use of the product." 7
The net effect is that contributory negligence which amounts to
assumption of risk will be a defense. Although it has not been dis-
cussed by the cases, a possible reason for talking in terms of contribu-
tory negligence, rather than assumption of risk, might be a desire to
have the defendant prevail even though the plaintiff does not have the
awareness or realization of the danger involved which assumption of
risk ordinarily demands.""
Contributory negligence has also been the language used when the
115 E.g., Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 107; Simmons v. Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P. 2d 633 (1957); Hansen v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F. 2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
116 Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E. 2d 668 (1941).
11 Prosser, supra note 90, at 1147-48.
"s See Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (Hawaii 1961), where the court said
that contributory negligence is not a complete defense in implied warranty
"unless the contributory negligence practically amounts to an assumption of
risk. On appeal the circuit court said: "Contributory negligence less than
assumption of risk will not bar recovery in implied warranty under thefacts of this case." Brown v. Chapman, 304 F. 2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1962).(Emphasis added.)
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damages which the plaintiff has been able to recover have been limited
to those arising before discovery of the defect. This is essentially an
application of the doctrine of avoidable consequences which denies
recovery for damages which reasonably could have been avoided."19 In
Nelson v. Anderson 20 the court said:
While there are cases to the contrary, we believe that the weight
of authority and sound reason support the view that, in an action
based on a breach of implied warranty, contributory negligence
of the buyer is a good defense insofar as a right to recover con-
sequential damages is concerned.
The effect is the same whether the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences or the defense of contributory negligence (amounting to as-
sumption of risk) is followed. However, one difference between the
two theories is that the latter must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.
C. Intervening Cause
A common means of limiting liability is by finding that the conduct
of the defendant was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.
This approach has not often appeared in warranty cases, probably
because it is either easier or traditional to find some other language by
which to limit liability. However, it may be beneficial to argue, on oc-
casion, that even though there may have been a breach of warranty, an-
other or intervening cause was the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss.
One intervening cause, which has previously been discussed in terms
of whether a warranty exists at all, is the buyer's failure to inspect.
Comment 13 of UCC section 2-314 gives a good summary:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course neces-
sary to show not only the existence of the warranty, but the fact
that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the warranty
was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In such an action
an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted from
some action or event following his own delivery of the goods
can operate as a defense .... Action by the buyer following an
examination of the goods which ought to have indicated the
defect complained of can be shown as matter bearing on whether
the breach itself was the cause of the injury. (Emphasis added.)
Another possible intervening cause is the conduct of a third party.
In Halpern v. fad Constr. Co.," 2 causes of action in warranty'
against a tire manufacturer were dismissed because the intervening
handlers had knowledge of the defect. This case is of questionable
weight, however, as this was the extent of the opinion, and the court
cited no authority for its holding.
119 See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES, ch. 5 (1935).
120 245 Minn. 445, 450, 72 N.W. 2d 861, 865 (1955) ; see Razey v. J. B. Colt Co.,
106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y.S. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
12127 Misc. 2d 675, 202 NY..S. 2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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In Schneider v. Suhrrnann,12- the plaintiff contracted trichinosis
from mettwurst which, contrary to the expectations of the wholesaler,
the retailer had failed to process. In refusing to find the wholesaler
liable, the court said:
[T]he supplier is deemed to warrant the product to be rea-
sonably safe and suitable for the use for which it is intended.
That rule, sound where applicable, may only be invoked where
the supplier knows, or reasonably should know, that the retailer
is to sell the product to consumers without further processing. 123
What this case may really be saying, however, is not that the con-
duct of the retailer was an intervening cause, but that it was the sole
cause and there was no breach of warranty.124
In Standard Oil Co. v. Daniel Burkhartsmeier Cooperage Co.,,2 a
young boy was severely burned when he lit a match, causing a nearby
barrel to explode. Plaintiff, a dealer in petroleum products, sold these
barrels for the storage of its products. The boy recovered against the
plaintiff, and plaintiff sought indemnity from the defendant on the
basis of an express warranty that the barrels had been thoroughly
cleaned. The defendant argued that the lighting of the match was an
independent intervening cause of the injury. Although the court rejected
the defense contention, it indicated that the plaintiff might be denied
recovery in warranty even though he was not negligent, if the cause
of the injury was not probable or foreseeable:
Likelihood of an explosion from contact with an open flame was
reasonably probable and foreseeable as a direct result of the de-
livery of the barrel to persons ignorant of its dangerous contents.
It is not necessary that the precise manner of the explosion
should have been foreseen.' 12 6
The application of the negligence concept of foreseeability as a
possible means of limiting liability is evident in cases such as Schneider
and Burkhartsmeier. However, both cases are concerned with fore-
seeability of cause. This should be contrasted with the modern tendency,
previously discussed in the section on extent of liability, to use the
concept of foreseeability of plaintiff as a means of extending warranty
liability.
Where the plaintiff has been negligent, the cases do not appear to
talk in terms of his negligence being the superseding or proximate cause
of his injuries. These cases are generally discussed in terms of con-
tributory negligence. But it is still arguable, especially in those jurisdic-
12 28 Utah 2d 35, 327 P. 2d 822 (1958).
123 Id. at 39, 327 P. 2d at 825.
324 See Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322
(1963).
12 333 Ill. App. 338, 77 N.E. 2d 526 (1948).
126 Id. at 351, 77 N.E. 2d at 533.
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tions which do not permit the defense of contributory negligence in
warranty actions, that liability should be denied because the negligence
of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of his damages.
Another argument, similar to the foreseeability approach, is that
there should not be liability for unknowable risks. This is an argument
that has been made in the cigarette-cancer cases in which it is contended
that there should be no liability if existing human knowledge, at the
time the plaintiff contracted cancer, did not show any causal relation-
ship between cigarettes and cancer. The argument was successful in
Lartique v. R. I. Reynolds Co."' in which the court, applying Louisi-
ana law, said that it is reasonable to draw the line somewhere and that
Louisiana draws it at "unknowable risks." Further, it need only be
shown that the present state of human knowledge does not show any
risk, and it is not necessary to show that the effects were such that
"no developed human skill or foresight could have avoided them."' 28
This same argument failed when the same court applied Florida
law in Green v. American Tobacco Co.12 9 The court had certified the
question of whether liability was limited by the extent of existing hu-
man knowledge to the Florida Supreme Court and had received a nega-
tive answer.
D. Misuse of the Product
A few cases have said that there can be no recovery where there has
been a misuse of the product by the plaintiff." 0 This may also be dis-
cussed in terms of contributory negligence, but what is really being
said is that the warranty did not extend to the use being made of the
product or that no warranty was breached.
This situation is likely to come up when the plaintiff has not fol-
lowed directions as to the proper use of the product."1 Similarly, the
court in Silverman v. Swift & Co.1" said: "The implied warranty that
goes with a sale of raw pork is that it is fit for eating only after it has
been cooked with the commonly used precautions prevailing among the
general public."
E. Failure to Give Notice
There were no notice requirements under common law, but both
the USA 3 3 and the UCC"3 require that notice of a breach of warranty
be given within a reasonable time. This requirement has not been
strictly enforced, however. It has been held not to apply where per-
127 317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
"2 Id. at 39.
129 325 F. 2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
230Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 172 Ore. 116, 139 P. 2d 788 (1943).
1 Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E. 2d 770 (1958).
'3' 141 Conn. 450, 107 A. 2d 277 (1954).
3 UNIFORM SALES Acr §49.
134 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607(3) (a).
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sonal injuries have been sustained'35 or, assuming that lack of privity
is not otherwise an obstacle to recovery, where the parties are remote.
A major case holding that the notice requirement does not apply
where the parties are not in a buyer-seller relationship is Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc."6 In that case the court held that the liability
in question was independent of a sales contract and thus not governed
by the notice provisions of the Sales Act: "The notice ... requirement
is not an appropriate one for the court to adopt in actions by injured
consumers against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt."'' 7
The court did think that as between the immediate parties the notice
requirement was a sound rule designed to protect the seller against
unduly delayed claims.
Where notice of breach is necessary, it must be timely and adequate.
These are generally questions for the jury, and the defendant would
probably have to show prejudice for notice to be defective as a matter
of law.138 Comment 4 to UCC section 2-607 indicates that what con-
stitutes a "reasonable time" will vary with the position of the buyer.
In some jurisdictions the giving of notice must be affirmatively
pleaded, 39 while in others the filing of the complaint within a reasonable
time will be sufficient notice.140 Failure of the indemnitee to give notice
to the indemnitor will bar him from recovering.1 41
F. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs have often contended that warranty was a contract action
so as to get the benefit of a longer statute of limitations. This conten-
tion has generally been upheld where the plaintiff's loss has been of a
commercial nature. But where the plaintiff has suffered a personal in-
jury, limitations governing personal injury have been applied regard-
less of the theory of warranty adopted.14 2
Another problem is determining when the cause of action arises.
Most cases hold that a cause of action on a warranty does not arise
until the defect is or should have been discovered.143 Some states, how-
ever, hold that the breach occurred at the time of the sale and action
135 Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E. 2d 713 (1956).
'3a 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897 (1962).
13 Id. at 61, 377 P. 2d at 900.
138 American Furniture Co. v. Veazie, 131 Colo. 340, 281 P. 2d 803 (1955) (notice
not timely); Clarizo v. Spada Distrib. Co., 231 Ore. 516, 373 P. 2d 689(1962) (notice adequate); Nadeau v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 102
N.H. 212, 153 A .2d 791 (1959) (timeliness of notice question of fact for
trial court).
39 Smith v. Pizitz, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960).
140 Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 265 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 916 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
141 Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto Ins. Co., 63 F. 2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933).
'42Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P. 2d 163 (1954).
143 Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, 351 S.W. 2d 119 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961).
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accrues at that time whether the defect is discovered or not. 4 4 Where
privity is not otherwise a bar, the action against the manufacturer
usually does not arise until the final sale to the remote purchaser.1
45
Some cases hold that an indemnitee's right of action arises at the
time he purchases from the indemnitor,1 46 while others say that the
action accrues when he knew or should have known of the defect.
147
The Uniform Commercial Code states that the cause of action arises
when tender of delivery is made, regardless of the buyer's lack of
knowledge of the defect. 4 8 But an exception is made where the war-
ranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the goods. In
adopting this provision, it was thought that uniformity and stability
in commercial transactions justified the possibility that a plaintiff might
occasionally be barred by the four-year statute of limitations of the
Code.
VIII. FoOD AND BEVERAGES
Long before the growth of the modern law of implied warranties,
the vendor of food and beverages was held to a special responsibility
to the consumer. In the early days of the manorial courts, local regula-
tions governed quantity and quality. The first of a series of English
statutes imposing criminal penalties for the marketing of "corrupt"
food and drink for immediate consumption appeared in 1266.149 It is
probable that those who failed to show the degree of skill prevailing
in the trade were also civilly liable in some sort of action on the case.
Beginning in the fifteenth century, the English cases talked of this
special responsibility in terms of implied warranty, but only by way
of dictum. 50 Subsequent American cases, in finding the seller liable,
adopted this language of warranty; and today the seller of food and
beverages impliedly warrants, at least to the immediate buyer, that his
goods are wholesome and reasonably fit for human consumption.' 5'
With minor differences, the implied warranty with respect to food and
beverage is the same as implied warranties in general.
Before the plaintiff can recover he must show that the food was not
wholesome or fit, that the unwholesomeness existed at the time of the
sale, and that the defect caused his illness or injury.
44 See Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S. 2d 1010
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (memorandum decision).
14 See Bernstein v. Remington Arms Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 910, 238 N.Y.S. 2d
78 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (memorandum decision).
146 Outwater v. Miller, 3 App. Dic. 2d 670, 215 N.Y.S. 2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
(memorandum decision); E. 0. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Kil-Tone Co., 105
N.J.L. 109, 143 AtI. 332 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
14 7 See Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257,
360 P. 2d 897 (1961).
148 UN FORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §2-725.
149 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumner), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1103 (1960).150 Y.B. 9 Hen. VI, f. 53 B, pl. 37 (1431).
'51 See, e.g., Simon v. Graham Bakery, 31 N.J. Super. 117, 105 A. 2d 877 (1954).
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The unwholesomeness of the food is most easily shown when a
foreign substance is found. Some substances, such as worms 5 2 or
mice,15 3 are sufficiently repulsive so as to make the food unwholesome
without any further showing. Where the foreign substance is not com-
monly regarded as repulsive, such as pieces of cork'5 4 or a nail,155
further proof that it rendered the food or beverage unfit may be neces-
sary.
Food has been found not to be unwholesome as a matter of law
where the invading substance is natural to that type of food or its
presence should have been anticipated by the plaintiff. This situation
occurs most often when bones or seeds are found in the food. Liability
has been denied where a chicken bone was found in a chicken pie,'56 a
fish bone found in a fish dinner,'5 7 or a prune pit encountered in a jar of
prune butter. 58 It is not necessary that the natural substance be a usual
thing; it is enough that it is occasionally present and that the consumer
ought to anticipate its presence. 59 Other courts have held that it is a
jury question whether the injury was caused by a natural substance,'
and the Wisconsin court has adopted the test of "reasonable expecta-
tion."16' Although the substance is natural to some dishes, it may be
foreign to the specific item involved, as where a piece of crab shell is
found in a food not containing crab.' 61
If a foreign substance is not involved, unwholesomeness may be
proved by showing that others suffered similar ill effects. This is most
often appropriate in food poisoning cases where the food is not out-
wardly unfit or harmful.' 6 3 Conversely, the fact that others did not be-
come ill may be proof that the food was not unwholesome. 6 4
The plaintiff must also show that the defect existed at the time
of the sale. This is most easily done when a foreign substance is found
in a tightly sealed container or where food not outwardly harmful, but
shown to be unwholesome, has come in a sealed package.165 Proof is
152 Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
153 Hope Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 222 Ark. 52, 257 S.W. 2d 272 (1953).
154 Willis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 199 Misc. 821, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 9 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (per curiam).
155 Copeland v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 187 Misc. 456, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
156Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d 41, 245 P. 2d 316 (1952); Mix v. Ingersoll
Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P. 2d 144 (1936).
"5 Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
158 Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 19 Misc. 2d 935, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
159 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., supra note 156.
160 Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A. 2d 442 (1959).
161 Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W. 2d 64 (1960).
162 Arnaud's Restaurant v. Cotter, 212 F. 2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954).
163 Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 183, 106 N.E. 2d 731 (1952).
164 See Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P. 2d 740 (1942).
165 E.g., Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.
2d 918 (1961); Gonzales Safeway Stores, Inc., 147 Colo. 358, 363 P. 2d 667(1961) ; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939);
Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962).
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more difficult where a foreign substance is found in an unsealed pro-
duct, but the circumstances may show that the foreign substance must
have made its invasion at the time of manufacture, as where it is deeply
embedded in the food.16 The most difficult of proof cases are those in
which the food is unpackaged and not outwardly harmful, and it is
particularly difficult if the food is subject to spoilage.167
Closely connected with the necessity of showing unwholesomeness
is proof of causation, and the mere fact that several people suffered ill
effects may not be sufficient to allow recovery where other possible
causes are not eliminated. For example, in Walraven v. Sprague,
Warner & Co.'6 s a number of people became ill after eating contamin-
ated crab salad. Recovery against the vendor of the meat was denied
because other ingredients added by the housewife or the use of utensils
or her hands might also have been the cause.
Recovery may be had where other possible causes are eliminated.
Evidence that another person ate the same things as the plaintiff with
the exception of the item allegedly causing the illness is sufficient proof
of causation. 169 But recovery has been denied where the plaintiff's ill-
ness might have been caused by a virus infection prevalent in the com-
munity, in spite of evidence that a doctor had diagnosed the illness as
food poisoning. 70
Showing the illness of others may be combined with the elimination
of other causes. In Armour & Co. v. Leasure17 1 recovery was had when
it was shown that several persons became ill after eating corned beef
and there was medical testimony that the corned beef was the only
thing that could have caused botulism.
The plaintiff may have to show that there was no reasonable op-
portunity for tampering or no actual tampering with the product. 2
However, most courts, realizing the difficulty in proving the absence
of tampering, put the burden on the defendant to show that tampering
did occur.' 7 ' The question of tampering usually arises in bottle cases
where the cap may be removed and replaced with relative ease.
In accord with a reluctance to give damages solely for emotional
distress for fear of fraudulent claims, recovery may be denied where
the plaintiff has suffered some mental shock, but no physical injury.7 4
166 Walraven v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 235 Wis. 259, 292 N.W. 883 (1940).
167 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Adams, 213 Md. 521, 132 A. 2d 484 (1956).
168 235 Wis. 259, 292 N.W. 883 (1940).
169 Barfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 329 Mass. 641, 110 N.E. 2d 103 (1953).
170 Payton v. Lee, 88 Ga. App. 422, 77 S.E. 2d 77 (1953).
171 177 Md. 393, 9 A. 2d 572 (1939).
172 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E. 2d
442 (1956).
173 Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958). Paul v.
Rodgers Bottling Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 680, 6 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1960), has
even said that the defendant assumed the risk of tampering.
:74 Tuttle v. Meyer Dairy Prods. Co., 75 Ohio L. Abs. 587, 138 N.E. 2d 429
(Ct. App. 1956).
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He may even be denied recovery where the physical suffering is the
result of a psychological reaction and not due to the harmful effects
of the contaminated food or beverage.175 The majority, however, per-
mits recovery for nausea, vomiting, and other consequential illnesses,
even if they result from psychological distress rather than the harmful
effects of a "corrupt" food or beverage or mere contact therewith.17 6
Nominal damages for emotional distress alone may even be recovered
in some cases.
1 77
IX. DRUGS
Although there have been few drug cases dealing with implied war-
ranties, it is a rapidly growing and increasingly complex area. War-
ranties in the field of drugs are, for the most part, governed by the
general rules of warranty law. The warranty of merchantability is that
the drug is reasonably fit for its general purposes. The warranty of
fitness requires that the seller have knowledge of the particular purpose
of the buyer or user and that the buyer or user rely on the skill and
judgment of the seller. It is arguable that, at least as to prescribed
drugs, there are only particular purposes.
The retailer is much less likely to be liable than the manufacturer
in a drug case. Where the drug is purchased by its trade or brand name
or by prescription, there would seldom be reliance on the druggist's
skill and judgment, and thus no warranty of fitness. Further, the drug-
gist may not even be aware of the buyer's particular purpose, at least
where it is not indicated by the prescription.
The retailer may still be liable under an implied warranty of mer-
chantability, however, where the drug is prescribed. If the drug is not
fit only as to the plaintiff, there is obviously no breach, because the drug
is fit for ordinary purposes. If the drug is safe as prescribed, but wrong-
fully prepared by the druggist, the latter may have breached the war-
ranty of merchantability if that warranty can exist as to prescribed
drugs. In any case, the druggist would probably be negligent. The war-
ranty is also probably breached where the drug was properly prescribed
by a doctor on the basis of the manufacturer's literature, was properly
prepared by the pharmacist, and still caused harm.
Retailer liability would be easier to establish where the drug is not
prepared on the basis of a prescription. The buyer frequently may
make his purpose known, and thus he probably relies on the skill and
judgment of the druggist. It may be arguable that reliance is precluded
in some circumstances, as where a statute makes it unlawful to dis-
pense drugs without a prescription.
175 Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245 P. 2d 84 (1952).
176 See, e.g., Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332
P. 2d 258 (1958).
177 Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E. 2d 80 (1960).
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Many drugs are produced by large companies and merely dis-
tributed by the druggist. Where privity is still a requirement, the manu-
facturer may not be accessible to the plaintiff. However, drugs are
treated in the same category as foods,1 8 so privity is not likely to be
a bar-particularly in view of the general breakdown of privity in
many areas.
The problem of privity becomes increasingly significant as more
drugs and more powerful drugs are being manufactured, with the drug-
gist serving as a mere conduit to the buyer. In these cases, there is little
reason for holding the retailer liable and, as he must stock these drugs
for sale by prescription, it is arguable that he is merely performing
a service as mentioned in connection with the Perlmutter case.' 7 9 It
may also be arguable that there is no "sale," but merely a "service"
rendered, when a drug administered by a physician causes the patient
some harm. This argument was made and rejected in Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Labs.80
As to the manufacturer of drugs capable of harmful effects, a duty
of meticulous compliance with an extremely high standard of conduct
may be imposed. The ability or possibility of causing serious harmful
effects is considered in establishing the standard of conduct required.
Rigid compliance with all statutory and governmental requirements
are necessary, particularly as to testing, experiments, and reporting.
Full and frank warnings of possible dangers and explicit directions as
to usage are mandatory.
An unresolved question is the extent of liability of the manufacturer
of a useful drug which has permanent side effects even when made
without defect or impurity. It has been suggested that there is no breach
of warranty for such deleterious effect, liability being confined to that
imposed for failure to give adequate warning.
As to the manufacturer in general, the problem is primarily one of
degree as to what constitutes a breach or lack of breach of any alleged
warranty involved. Otherwise the general rules of warranty and the
applicable defenses thereto apply.
X. ALLERGIES
The problem of allergic reactions generally comes up when a drug,
or cosmetic, or something which comes in-contact with the body is in-
volved. However, there is no liability where there is an allergic re-
action to a food, such as strawberries, at least when it is sold in its
natural state. But where an artificial substance, such as an additive,
has been added to the food before the sale, a warranty would probably
'18 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960),
79 A.L.R. 2d 290 (1961).in See p. 148 and note 52 supra.
180 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960), 79 A.L.R. 2d 290 (1961).
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arise. Once again, before the plaintiff can recover he must show a war-
ranty, a breach, and causation.
The most difficult task for the plaintiff is showing that the reaction
was caused by a defect in the product rather than an individual idio-
syncrasy. In the majority of jurisdictions, the plaintiff must show that
the product is harmful and would be injurious to the "normal" per-
son.'"' If he does so, he will have little difficulty in recovering. Other
courts, however, only require a showing that a "small proportion" of
the users would be afflicted.' 2 Although these appear to be different
tests, all of the allergy cases are reconcilable on their facts: in those
cases in which the plaintiff failed to show that the product would be
injurious to the normal person, he also failed to show that even a small
proportion of users would be harmed.' 8 3
Evidence of other complaints about the product in question, or a
lack thereof, is relevant in determining the "normality" and "fore-
seeability" of the plaintiff.8 4
Denial of liability may be predicated on finding either that no war-
ranty was breached or that the breach was not the proximate cause of
the allergic reaction. The fact that the plaintiff suffers some reaction
does not preclude a finding that the product was fit for ordinary pur-
poses and thus of merchantable quality. Or if it is found that the
product was an actual cause of the reaction, it may still be held that
the unusual physical makeup of the plaintiff was the proximate cause
of his suffering.
Foreseeability is often discussed in allergy-warranty cases. The
court in Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co. 8" said that the plaintiff must show
that
(a) the product involved contains a harmful ingredient;
(b) such ingredient is harmful to a reasonably foreseeable
and appreciable class or number of potential users of the product;
and
(c) plaintiff has been innocently injured in the use of the
product in the manner and for the purpose intendedlSG (Em-
phasis added.)
This is an area in which the cigarette-cancer argument that there
should not be liability for unknowable risks might be significant.ls 7
1s Ray v. J. C. Penney Co., 274 F. 2d 519 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Bonowski v. Revlon,
Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W. 2d 5 (1959).
182 Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A. 2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App.
1939); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E. 2d 697
(1939).
183 See Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 'Wash. 2d 347, 378 P. 2d 298 (1963).
184 See Stanton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 111. App. 496, 499, 38 N.E. 2d 801,
802 (1942).185 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P. 2d 298 (1963).
186 Id. at 358, 378 P. 2d at 304.
1 s7See p. 159 supra.
[Vol. 48
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
For the risk to be "unknowable," however, it would probably be neces-
sary to have carried out at least a certain minimum amount of testing
and investigation.
If the allergic reaction is foreseeable, there is a duty to warn and
failure to do so will give rise to an action for negligence. When the
warranty of merchantability is at issue, the existence of a warning is
most appropriate to the question of assumption of risk, although it
has been said in a non-allergy case that a failure to warn was "the factor
which caused the warranty to be breached.""1 8 Whatever else it may be,
the absence or presence of a warning is not the cause of the breach.
If there has not been a warning, the warranty is breached when some
damage is done. If there has been a warning, it may be said that there
was no warranty as to the harm suffered because the use was not ordi-
nary, or it may be raised as a matter of assumption of risk (or con-
tributory negligence). If the warranty of fitness is at issue, the exist-
ence of a warning is important to the question of reliance.
In what is possibly the leading case in this area, Crotty v. Sharten-
berg's-New Haven, Inc.,'" the defendant was held liable even though
a warning and instructions to take a patch test had been given, where
the test was ineffective. In this case the plaintiff was not even required
to show that an appreciable number of people for whom the test was
also ineffective were also allergic to the product. This case may have
been subsequently limited by Hamon v. Digliani'9° which said that there
is an implied warranty to the ultimate consumer "that the product is
reasonably fit for the purpose intended and that it does not contain any
harmful and deleterious ingredient of which due and ample warning has
not been given."' 9' (Emphasis added.) The court in the Crotty case also
said that "if a buyer has either actual or constructive knowledge that he
is allergic to a particular substance, and knows or should know that he is
allergic to that substance, he cannot recover nor can he recover for im-
proper use."' 92
XI. STRICT LIABILITY
There has recently been a great deal of excitement over the ap-
parent willingness of some courts to accept a theory of strict liability
in products liability cases. Much of the excitement is due to a failure
to understand what is meant by strict liability, which is not to say that
it can be understood. It is an amorphous term at best.
Strict liability is not absolute liability such as is found in the case
of an ultra-hazardous product. There are no defenses to absolute
liability, while there are some t6 strict liability. Some writers have
188 See Hanson v. Mlurray, 190 Cal. App. 2d 617, 623-24, 12 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308
(1961).
189 147 Conn. 460, 162 A. 2d 513 (1960).
190 148 Conn. 710, 174 A. 2d 294 (1961).
19 Id. at 718, 174 A. 2d at 297.
192 147 Conn. at 467, 162 A. 2d at 517.
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referred to the breakdown of the privity requirement as the imposition
of strict liability. The refusal of the courts to honor a disclaimer has
been called strict liability. These are simply means by which the scope
of liability has been expanded within the field of warranty law, and
these methods and trends have been discussed previously.
There is another kind of strict liability which is unfolding outside
of the field of warranty law, at least in California, and which has
clearly been denominated as a tort action. This new liability is not
based on negligence, nor is it absolute liability. It is somewhere in be-
tween. The forerunner of this type of strict liability can be found in
section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, which provides for strict
liability in tort in the case of sellers of food and products for intimate
bodily use. The comment to this section makes it clear that liability is
not governed by the rules of warranty law:
The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance
on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill or judg-
ment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor any representation
or undertaking on the part of that seller. The seller is strictly
liable although, as is frequently the case, the consumer does not
even know who he is at the time of consumption. The rule stated
in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to war-
ranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and
content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller"
in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to
the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs,
as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of
action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the
person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected
by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the
seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying
the product into the hands of the consumer. In short, "warranty"
must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in con-
nection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability
here settled as merely one of strict liability in tort.
1 93
But the rapid changes in the development of the law through judicial
decisions outmoded the 1962 tentative draft of section 402A.19 4 By
the most recently approved tentative draft, this section now applies to
any product regardless of whether or not it is intended for intimate
bodily use:
193 See comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1962).
294 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). The new
tentative draft has placed limitations on the expansion of products liability
which are actually contrary to common law liability developed within the
past few years. It would impose liability neither on a cigarette manufacturer
because smoking has a harmful side effect (comment i) nor on a drug
manufacturer for a drug which is unavoidably unsafe (comment k). Contra,
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 S. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), and Gottsdanker
v. Cutter Labs., supra note 178.
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Special Liability of Seller of Product to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property,
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer ,or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a pro-
duct, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.19
This change in the Restatement was prompted in substantial part
by the case of Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc.,196 in which the Cali-
fornia court held the manufacturer of a combination power tool strictly
liable to the user. In that case the plaintiff's wife bought him the power
tool as a present. The plaintiff had previously observed a demonstration
of the tool by a retailer and had studied the manufacturer's brochure.
While the plaintiff was working on a piece of wood, it suddenly flew
out and struck him in the forehead. Suit was brought against both the
manufacturer and the retailer for breaches of warranties and negligence.
The plaintiff's expert witness testified that the design of the tool was
defective. The trial judge ruled that there was no evidence that the
retailer was negligent or that he had breached an express warranty.
He also ruled that the manufacturer was not liable for breach of an
implied warranty. The jury found for the retailer but against the manu-
facturer, with no indication whether the verdict was based on negli-
gence or warranty or both.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that notice require-
ments as to warranty applied only as to the immediate seller and not as
to the manufacturer. Thus the plaintiff would not be barred by failure
to give timely notice. The court also held that the warranty rules would
not apply anyway because the manufacturer was strictly liable to the
user in tort when he placed an article on the market knowing that it
would be used without further inspection for defects.
What is the effect of finding strict liability in tort? In Greenman, it
simply meant that the plaintiff was not bound by the notice require-
ments of warranty law. More important, it means that the plaintiff need
not establish the existence of either an express or an implied warranty.
195 "With the exception of prenatal injuries, this is the most radical and spec-
tacular development in tort law during this century." RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS, Note to Institute §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
L96 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897 (1962) ; see Vandermark v. Ford, 61 A.C. 245,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168 (1964), extending strict liability to retailers.
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The failure of the plaintiff to show the existence of a warranty and
a breach thereof has often proved the best defense. But the effect of
not requiring the plaintiff to show a warranty is really the same as if
the scope of the warranty had been expanded. Strict liability is often
referred to as having originated in food cases, but those cases were
generally decided in a warranty context, with the scope of the warranty
simply being broadened.
Greenman does not mean that proximate cause no longer need be
shown or that other defenses would not apply. In California, con-
tributory negligence is not a defense to a warranty action. 97 However,
it may be a defense to a strict liability claim because that action is in
tort.
California recently held that the retailer is also strictly liable.' 98
Presumably, this strict liability arises under the same circumstances
as the strict liability of the manufacturer-when the product is to be
used without further inspection. Because the retailer is strictly liable,
the supreme court further held that disclaimers or restrictions on con-
tractual liability are not material.
The development of strict liability reflects, in part, a desire to spread
the losses resulting from a defective product. By making the manu-
facturer liable, the losses can be passed on to the consumers through
increased prices. It may also reflect a feeling that the manufacturer,
although he was not negligent, is somehow at fault because he created
a defective product. Whatever the reasons, strict liability is not a death
knell to the defense lawyer. Although some defenses may be eliminated,
assumption of risk and its many facets surely remains. And the de-
fense of contributory negligence may be even more readily available.1 99
XII. CONCLUSION
It would be unrealistic to think that it will not become increasingly
easier for the plaintiff to recover in a products liability case. This simply
means that the defense lawyer must work harder and with imagination.
The best possible defense is important not only in an individual case,
197 Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962);
Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963).
195 Vandermark v. Ford, supra note 196, where the notice requirement was held
not applicable where the question was one of strict liability.
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A, comment n (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964),
is as follows: "n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this
Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability,
the rule applied to strict liability cases ... applies. Contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure
to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of
its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a
defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user
or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery."
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but in helping to keep further expansion within sane and reasonable
bounds.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide a practical introduc-
tion into the field of implied warranties and perhaps serve as a rough
guide in leading the defense lawyer to more detailed and pertinent in-
formation. Hopefully it has done so.
